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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
McKEE, Circuit Judge. 
 
The Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms ("ATF ") 
appeals the district court's order restoring firearms 
privileges to Jerome E. Palma. Palma had previously pled 
guilty to two counts of making false statements on a federal 
income tax return in violation of 26 U. S. C. S 7206(1), and 
was thereby precluded from owning or possessingfirearms 
under 18 U. S. C. S 922(g)(1) because he was a convicted 
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felon. We hold that Palma did not make the necessary 
showing under 18 U.S.C. S 925(c) to obtain relief from that 
disability, and we will therefore reverse the district court's 
order based upon our decision in Rice v. United States, 68 
F.3d 702 (3d Cir. 1995). 
 
I. 
 
Palma was formerly a marketing director for various 
casinos in Atlantic City, New Jersey. While employed in 
that capacity he gave favorable treatment to various entities 
that were then doing business with the casinos in return 
for payoffs that totaled more than $100,000. Palma did not 
report any of the proceeds from those payoffs on his federal 
income tax returns. 
 
On December 10, 1987, Palma pled guilty to two counts 
of making false statements on his income tax return, a 
felony. The district court suspended his sentence, placed 
him on five years probation, and ordered him to pay a fine 
of $10,000. It is undisputed that Palma successfully 
completed all terms and conditions of his sentence, and 
that he was granted early discharge from his probation. It 
is also undisputed that Palma has not had any adverse 
contact with law enforcement since successfully completing 
his sentence. Until three years ago, Palma was employed by 
Palma/Lazar Associates as a real estate appraiser. In 1997, 
he started his own real estate appraisal business, ProData 
Services. He claims that his "need" to carry a gun relates to 
his real estate appraisal business. 
 
II. 
 
Under the Gun Control Act of 1968, persons convicted of 
crimes punishable by a term of imprisonment in excess of 
one year are prohibited from possessing, transporting, or 
receiving firearms. 18 U. S. C. S 922(g)(1). However, the 
Gun Control Act also authorizes the Secretary of the 
Treasury to lift the firearms disability imposed under 
S 922(g)(1) if "it is established to [the Secretary's] 
satisfaction that the circumstances regarding the disability, 
and the applicant's record and reputation, are such that 
the applicant will not be likely to act in a manner 
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dangerous to the public safety and that the granting of the 
relief would not be contrary to the public interest." 18 
U. S. C. S 925(c). The Secretary has delegated the authority 
to grant relief from the firearms disability to the Director of 
the ATF. 27 C. F. R. S 178.144(b), (d). 
 
The Act further provides that any "person whose 
application for relief from disabilities is denied by the 
Secretary may file a petition with the United States district 
court for the district in which he resides for a judicial 
review of such denial." 18 U. S. C. S 925(c). When reviewing 
a denial of relief from the disability, the district court "may 
in its discretion admit additional evidence where failure to 
do so would result in a miscarriage of justice." Id. 
 
Prior to 1992, when a convicted felon sought relief from 
the firearms disability, the ATF "conduct[ed] a broad-based 
field investigation concentrating on [the] statutory criteria 
surrounding the applicant's disabling conviction and the 
applicant's record and reputation." Rice v. United States, 68 
F.3d at 705 (citation omitted). The ATF "interview[ed] the 
applicant, the listed character references, employers, 
members of the community where the applicant live[d], the 
applicant's probation officer and other local law 
enforcement officers, [and consulted] other law enforcement 
records," Id. (citation and internal quotations omitted), so 
that it could properly act upon a petition to reinstate a 
convicted felon's firearms privileges. 
 
However, in each of the annual ATF appropriations bills 
passed since 1992, including the bill for FY 2000, Congress 
expressly prohibited the ATF from using any appropriated 
funds to investigate or act upon applications for relief 
under S 925(c). The following language was placed in each 
of those appropriations bills: "None of the funds 
appropriated herein shall be available to investigate or act 
upon applications for relief from Federal firearms 
disabilities under 18 U. S. C. S 925(c)." Pub. L. No. 106-58, 
113 Stat. 430, 434 (1999); Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 
2681, 2681-485 (1998); Pub. L. No. 105-61, 111 Stat. 
1272, 1277 (1997); Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009, 
3009-319 (1996); Pub. L. No. 104-52, 109 Stat. 468, 471 
(1995); Pub. L. No. 103-329, 108 Stat. 2382, 2385 (1994); 
Pub. L. No. 103-123, 107 Stat. 1226, 1228 (1993); Pub. L. 
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No. 102-393, 106 Stat. 1729, 1732 (1992). Congress' stated 
explanation for the prohibition is that a decision to grant 
relief from federal firearms disabilities "could have 
devastating consequences for innocent citizens if the wrong 
decision is made." S. Rep. No. 103-106, 103d Cong., 1st 
Sess. 29 (1993); S. Rep. No. 102-353 102 Cong., 2d Sess., 
19-20 (1992). Congress has reiterated that "[t]here is no 
reason to spend the Government's time or taxpayers' money 
to restore a convicted felon's right to own a firearm." H. R. 
Rep. No. 104-183, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 15 (1995). 
 
Some time after his conviction, Palma applied to the ATF 
for relief from his firearms disability underS 925(c). The 
ATF informed him that it could not act on his request 
because Congress' prohibition of the use of appropriated 
funds made the necessary background check and 
investigation impossible. Palma then filed a petition for 
relief from the firearms disability in the district court. In 
that petition, he conceded that Congress has prohibited the 
ATF from acting on petitions for relief. Petition for Relief at 
P 12. Nonetheless, he asked the district court to conduct its 
own inquiry into his fitness to own a firearm and to issue 
an order restoring his firearms privileges. Id. at PP 22-26. 
Palma's petition alleged 
 
       that he was fifty-nine years old, self-employed as a real 
       estate appraiser, and that his employment takes him 
       into high-crime, dangerous areas of Philadelphia and 
       suburbs . . . . that he had never been convicted of any 
       offense other than the one for which he pled guilty, 
       that he is of sound mind and has no history of mental 
       illness, that he has an excellent reputation for good 
       character, and attached to his petition affidavits from 
       reliable and responsible citizens. . . . that he is not 
       likely to act in a manner that is dangerous to the 
       safety of the public, and that granting the relief sought 
       would not be contrary to the public interest. 
 
Palma's Br. at 3. The government responded to Palma's 
petition by filing a motion to dismiss in which it asserted 
that the district court has "no authority to consider in the 
first instance the merits of a convicted felon's application 
for relief from his federal firearms disabilities." 
Government's Br. at 7. 
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The district court denied the government's motion to 
dismiss. The court issued an order setting a hearing on 
Palma's motion, and directing parties to submit proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law. The court also 
ordered that those proposals "should address the issue, 
assuming arguendo plaintiff meets his `heavy burden' on 
the merits, [of whether] the denial of appropriated funds to 
administer the law is a miscarriage of justice." App. at 31. 
Thereafter, pursuant to our decision in Rice v. United 
States, the district court asserted jurisdiction over Palma's 
petition and held an evidentiary hearing at which Palma 
and a number of character witnesses testified. At the 
conclusion of that hearing, the district court entered an 
order restoring Palma's firearms privileges. Palma v. United 
States, 48 F. Supp.2d 481 (E. D. Pa. 1999). This appeal 
followed. 
 
III. 
 
A. 
 
Before discussing the merits of the government's appeal, 
we must address Palma's contention that the government's 
appeal should be dismissed because it is untimely. The 
district court's judgment was entered on April 21, 1999. 
The government's notice of appeal was filed on June 17, 
1999; fifty-six days after the entry of judgment. 
Simultaneously with his appellee's brief, Palmafiled a 
motion to dismiss the government's appeal as untimely. 
Palma argues that inasmuch as his petition arises from a 
criminal conviction, his petition for relief from the firearms 
disability must, of necessity, also be a criminal proceeding. 
Therefore, he argues, the government's notice of appeal had 
to be filed within 30 days of the district court's judgment, 
as required in a criminal case, see F. R. A. P. 
4(b)(1)(B)[captioned "Appeal in a Criminal Case], rather 
than within 60 days as required in a civil case, see 
F. R. A. P. 4(a)(1)(B)[captioned "Appeal in a Civil Case]. We 
disagree. 
 
At the outset, we note that Palma's contention that his 
petition for relief is a criminal proceeding is completely 
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conclusory. He offers absolutely no authority for it. This 
may be because none exists. A proceeding can not be 
defined as criminal merely because it arises from, or 
pertains to, a prior criminal proceeding. For example, a 
petition for a writ of habeas corpus is an independent civil 
action even though the detention complained of arises out 
of a criminal action. Riddle v. Dyche, 262 U. S. 333, 335-36 
(1923). Similarly, a motion to correct, set aside or reduce a 
criminal sentence under 28 U. S. C. S 2255 is deemed civil 
for purposes of F. R. A. P. 4. See United States v. Hayman, 
342 U. S. 205, 209 n.4 (1952); Rule 11 -- Section 2255 
Proceedings. Moreover, parole and probation revocation 
hearings are civil proceedings even though they may 
subject an offender to a period of incarceration based upon 
a prior criminal conviction. Gagnon v. Scarpelli , 411 U. S. 
778, 788-89 (1973). 
 
Similarly, the scheme established under the Gun Control 
Act of 1968 plainly demonstrates that petitions for judicial 
review under S 925(c) are civil proceedings. Convicted felons 
are not the only persons that firearms disabilities are 
imposed upon. The Gun Control Act imposes those 
disabilities on nine categories of persons: (1) convicted 
felons; (2) fugitives from justice; (3) unlawful users of 
controlled substances; (4) any person who has been 
adjudicated as a mental defective or who has been 
committed to a mental institution; (5) illegal aliens; (6) 
persons dishonorably discharged from the armed forces; (7) 
persons who have renounced their United States 
citizenship; (8) any person who is subject to a restraining 
order in a stalking case; and (9) any person who has been 
convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence. 18 
U. S. C. S 922(g)(1)-(9). Though one could plausibly argue 
that most of these categories implicate criminal 
proceedings, it certainly can not be argued that a challenge 
to a disability based upon dishonorable discharge, or 
renouncing citizenship is criminal. Yet, under S 925(c), any 
of the nine categories of persons listed in S 922(g)(1)-(9) may 
apply for reinstatement of firearms privileges. The 
application is made to the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and 
Firearms, an administrative agency. Judicial review of the 
ATF 's decision under S 925(c) is conducted under the 
familiar "arbitrary and capricious" standard of the 
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Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U. S. C. S 706(2)(A). See 
Bagdonas v. ATF, 93 F.3d 422, 425 (7th Cir. 1996); United 
States v. McGill, 74 F.3d 64, 66 (5th Cir. 1996); Bradley v. 
ATF, 736 F.2d 1238, 1240 (8th Cir. 1984); Kitchens v. ATF, 
535 F.2d 1197, 1199-1200 (9th Cir. 1976). Moreover, a 
petition for judicial review under S 925(c) names the 
government as the defendant or respondent. It is not an 
action brought by the "People of the United States" or a 
given State for violation of a criminal law. 
 
Palma's petition for judicial review under S 925(c) alleges 
that, inasmuch as he has no administrative relief from the 
firearms disability in light of Congress' appropriations ban, 
he is excused from seeking the administrative remedy that 
the Secretary is statutorily empowered to give, and the 
district court therefore should exercise its jurisdiction and 
afford him an avenue of relief. Petition, at PP 15,16, 17. 
Palma named himself as the petitioner, and the government 
as the respondent. His own pleading is therefore consistent 
with a civil, as opposed to a criminal, proceeding. 
 
Consequently, we hold that the government's appeal was 
timely under F. R. A. P. 4(a)(1)(B), and we will therefore 
deny Palma's motion to dismiss. 
 
B. 
 
In Rice v. United States, 68 F.3d 702 (3d Cir. 1995), we 
held that, despite the congressional prohibition against 
spending government funds to process S 925(c) applications 
for relief, a district court retains subject matter jurisdiction 
to consider a convicted felon's petition for relief from the 
federal firearms disability in the first instance. We 
concluded that the annual congressional bans on the 
expenditure of funds to process S 925(c) applications "do 
not evidence an intent to repeal or limit the district court's 
jurisdiction to review BATF 's . . . inaction on[a convicted 
felon's] section 925(c) application. . . ." Id. at 710. We also 
concluded that the "[ ]ATF 's continuing inability to process 
[a convicted felon's] section 925(c) application constitutes 
an undue delay excusing [the convicted felon] from 
exhausting his administrative remedies that allows him to 
seek judicial review." Id. 
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As a consequence of our decision in Rice, a district court 
entertaining a S 925(c) application for relief must 
"determine in the exercise of its sound discretion whether 
the facts [the convicted felon] alleges indicate a potential for 
a miscarriage of justice." Id. If so, a district court may 
permit the petitioner to "submit additional evidence of his 
fitness to have his firearms privileges restored, and, 
thereafter, [the court will] decide whether[the]. . . 
application satisfies section 925(c)'s standards for 
restoration of a convict's firearms privileges." Id., In Rice, 
we remanded with instructions to permit testimony only if 
the facts alleged by the petitioner indicated that a potential 
for a miscarriage of justice would otherwise result. We 
stated: 
 
       we will remand this case to the district court to 
       determine in the exercise of its sound discretion 
       whether the facts Rice alleges indicate a potential for a 
       miscarriage of justice. If so, it should then permit Rice 
       to submit additional evidence of his fitness to have his 
       firearms privileges restored and, thereafter, decide 
       whether Rice's application satisfies section 925(c)'s 
       standards for restoration of a convict's firearms 
       privileges. 
 
68 F.3d at 710 (emphasis added). We also explicitly noted 
that a convicted felon seeking relief under S 925(c) "bears a 
heavy burden" because "possession of a firearm after a 
disabling conviction is a privilege, not a right." Id. (citing 
Lewis v. United States, 445 U. S. 55 (1980)). 
 
The government contends that Rice's holding that district 
courts have subject matter jurisdiction over applications for 
relief from firearms disabilities despite Congress' ban on 
appropriations for S 925(c) investigations is"fundamentally 
flawed." Government's Br. at 18. As the government is 
quick to point out, Rice has been rejected by four other 
Courts of Appeals that have considered the issue. See 
McHugh v. Rubin, ___ F.3d ___, 2000 WL 955420 (2d Cir. 
July 11, 2000); Owen v. Magaw, 122 F.3d 1350 (10th Cir. 
1997); Burtch v. Department of the Treasury, 120 F.3d 1087 
(9th Cir. 1997); United States v. McGill, 74 F.3d 64 (5th Cir. 
1996). Cf. Saccacio v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco & 
Firearms, 211 F.3d 102 (4th Cir. 2000)(Not taking direct 
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issue with our analysis in Rice because of its holding that 
the Secretary's denial of an application for relief is a 
jurisdictional requirement that is not satisfied simply 
because of the agency's failure to process the application). 
However, despite its disagreement with Rice, the 
government realizes that Rice is binding on us1 and that the 
district court was bound by that decision. Therefore, as the 
government also concedes, the district court did not err 
under Rice in exercising jurisdiction over Palma's S 925 (c) 
application. Nonetheless, the government judiciously 
submits that "en banc reconsideration of Rice may be 
warranted at a suitable juncture, in this Court's discretion." 
Government's Br. at 18. 
 
However, we need not now respond to the government's 
concerns about our analysis in Rice because, inasmuch as 
we conclude that Palma failed to establish the requisite 
"miscarriage of justice," he is not entitled to have the 
firearms disability removed in any event. 
 
The district court held that "the government's failure to 
provide funds to investigate and process applications for 
relief as provided in the statute constitutes a miscarriage of 
justice, where, . . . [Palma] meets the statutory 
requirements for such relief and there is no way for him to 
obtain the relief authorized by the statute." 48 F. Supp.2d 
at 486. In so holding, the district court misappliedS 925(c), 
and misinterpreted our holding in Rice. Clearly, under the 
unambiguous language of the statute, it is not the absence 
of administrative relief that constitutes a "miscarriage of 
justice." Rather, the convicted felon must allege facts in his 
or her application for relief which "indicate a potential for a 
miscarriage of justice," if the petition is denied. Therefore, 
a showing of a "potential for a miscarriage of justice" is the 
threshold showing which a convicted felon must make 
under Rice in order for the district court to permit the 
applicant to submit evidence of his or her fitness to have 
firearms privileges restored.2 Then, and only then, can the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. See Third Circuit IOP 9.1. 
 
2. Although S 925(c) refers to "additional evidence", it is obvious that, 
in 
the current context there will be no evidence other than that which may 
be received from the petitioner as there will be no formal denial, no 
investigation and no report. 
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district court receive such evidence and consider it in 
determining whether the applicant satisfies the other 
requirements of S 925(c) -- i. e., whether the applicant will 
not be likely to act in a manner dangerous to public safety 
and that the granting of relief would not be contrary to the 
public interest. 
 
A contrary reading of S 925(c) yields absurd results. It 
would sanction removal of the disability based upon 
something tantamount to an ex parte proceeding that is 
controlled by the convicted felon because the district court 
would have to receive whatever admissible evidence the 
petitioner offered and render a decision based solely upon 
that one-sided record whenever a petition for relief is filed. 
For example, one who seeks to obtain assault weapons in 
order to launch an attack upon members of a religious or 
ethnic minority group or a bothersome neighbor could 
always establish a "miscarriage of justice" based upon the 
prohibition of using appropriations to investigate his/her 
fitness to own or possess firearms. Such a petition would 
thereby open the courthouse door for a hearing, in which 
the judge would hear positive things the petitioner chose. 
Accordingly, the judge may never learn the kind of 
information that an investigation could ferret out (i.e., the 
"bothersome" neighbor who may have a justifiable concern 
over lifting the petitioner's disability).3 
 
Rice simply gives the district court jurisdiction to 
adjudicate a petition under S 925(c). However, absent a 
preliminary showing of a miscarriage of justice, the 
petitioner is not entitled to introduce evidence to support 
the petition. That preliminary showing must, therefore, 
arise from the averments in the four corners of the petition. 
In the event that the petitioner can establish that removing 
the disability is necessary to prevent a miscarriage of 
justice, it is certainly possible that a law enforcement or 
regulatory agency other than ATF could conduct an 
appropriate inquiry to allow the court to rule upon 
petitioner's claim. However, Congress clearly did not intend 
to authorize such an inquiry unless justice requires it. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. We set forth this admittedly extreme hypothetical not to cast 
aspersions on Mr. Palma, but to illustrate the problems evidenced in the 
district court's interpretations of the "miscarriage of justice" standard. 
 
                                11 
  
Here, Palma claims that he needs to carry a gun for"self- 
defense," and he makes two allegations in support of that 
claim. First, he alleges that "[t]he nature of Petitioner's 
employment requires him to travel in high crime areas in 
order to conduct appraisals." Petition, at P 20. Second, he 
states "Petitioner seeks restoration of Federalfirearms 
privileges so that he may possess a firearm for self-defense 
purposes." Id. at P 21. The two justifications thus boil down 
to a single assertion that Palma needs to have the privilege 
of possessing a gun restored for purposes of self-defense. 
However, Palma's vague and generalized claim of self- 
defense falls woefully short the stringent "miscarriage of 
justice" threshold that must be established before the 
district court can receive evidence in support of his S 925(c) 
petition. 
 
Palma's "self-defense" claim lacks any foundation in this 
record. Palma's petition does not identify any particular 
high crime area where he is in danger, nor does it even 
allege a single instance where his life has been placed in 
danger because he had to conduct an appraisal. At the 
hearing on Palma's petition, Palma testified that the "high 
crime areas" referred to in his petition are actually the 
entire City of Philadelphia and its surrounding suburbs of 
Bucks, Delaware and Montgomery Counties. App. at 71. 
 
       Q: In your view, it's dangerous in Philadelphia, and it's 
       dangerous in Delaware County, and Bucks County and 
       Montgomery County, any of the surrounding counties, 
       as well as the City is dangerous, right? 
 
       A: That's correct. 
 
App. at 71. He was not even able to identify any particular 
part of the city or the surrounding counties as being 
particularly dangerous. Id. 
 
       Q: You are not able to . . . identify any particular high 
       crime areas; is that right? 
 
       A: That's correct. 
 
Id. Moreover, despite his concerns about conducting 
appraisals in Philadelphia and the surrounding counties 
unarmed, Palma admitted that he was not aware of a single 
incident in which an appraiser had been personally 
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attacked on the job. Id. at 73. Finally, Palma neither alleged 
in this petition nor offered testimony that an appraiser's job 
is dependent upon carrying a gun. On the contrary, it was 
openly acknowledged that no one is required to conduct 
appraisals in places that are considered genuinely unsafe. 
Id. at 95. 
 
When Palma was specifically asked if any appraiser had 
ever told him of being personally threatened in the 
dangerous environs of Philadelphia and southeastern 
Pennsylvania in the 12 years Palma had been in the real 
estate appraisal business, he conceded that none had, 
although appraisers had reported some stolen equipment. 
Id. at 72. The district court noted in its Findings of Fact 
that: "Mr. Palma testified that he would only use a gun in 
self-defense in a situation where his life was threatened, 
and not in a situation merely where property was being 
stolen." 48 F. Supp. 2d at 481. 
 
Yet, the only incidents that Palma could relate to the 
court concerned property loss, not threats to life. The court 
noted: "[Palma] testified as to one incident in which an 
appraiser's camera was stolen out of his car, and while the 
appraiser was successfully chasing down the camera thief, 
someone else stole the car radio." Id. at 482. The court did 
note that Palma also testified that "other appraisers had 
been robbed," but it is not clear that those incidents 
involved "robberies" in the technical sense, or that they 
involved a threat to anyone's person because Palma also 
testified (as noted above) that he was unaware of any 
appraiser being "personally attacked." App. at 73. The 
overall context of his testimony clearly does not suggest 
that the generalized reference to robbery involved a 
personal attack because "Mr. Palma was unable testify as 
to the specifics of any other incident." Id . His inability to do 
so is as inconsistent with his belief that the City of 
Philadelphia and its surrounding suburbs are so dangerous 
as to justify restoring his privilege of carrying a gun, as it 
is with a finding that a "miscarriage of justice" would result 
from denying his petition. 
 
Thus, the foundation for his attempt to gain relief from 
the firearms disability rests upon little more than the fact 
that he would feel safer, and be more comfortable in 
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Philadelphia and the surrounding counties, if he carried a 
gun during his appraisals. This hardly satisfies the burden 
he must meet before the district court can receive evidence 
in support of his petition. 
 
IV. 
 
Accordingly, we will reverse the district court's order 
restoring Palma's firearms privileges and remand with 
directions to the district court to enter an order dismissing 
the petition for relief from disability. 
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